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Abstract
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent Velvet Revolution in 1989,
the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began the complex transition from
a centrally controlled command economy to a market-based economy. The transition
necessitated the removal of non-performing loans from state-owned banks’ balance sheets,
a task assigned by the Ministry of Finance to the newly formed Consolidation Bank
(Konsolidační Banka, hereafter “KOB”). Established on February 25, 1991, the KOB was
specifically mandated to acquire and restructure what were known as “TOZ” loans,
unsecured debt with no amortization schedules and unsustainably high interest rates. The
KOB used funds from the State Bank of Czechoslovakia to acquire CZK 125 billion
(approximately $4.2 billion, or about 10% of GDP) in TOZ loans from four state-owned banks.
The purchase was made at 80% of the loans’ nominal value. In 1993, upon Czechoslovakia’s
split into two sovereign nations, the KOB’s loan portfolio and operations were divided
between the Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and Consolidation Bank Bratislava. Although
the CBP took over the management of the bad loan portfolio, it also engaged in many other
commercial banking activities. The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic therefore
decided in 2001 to create the Czech Consolidation Agency (CCA) to handle both the TOZ
loans and other bad debt that had been accumulated throughout the economic transition
period. After significantly reducing its assets under management through block sales of
receivables, the CCA ceased operations on December 31, 2007, transferring the CZK 17.2
billion remaining on its balance sheet to the Ministry of Finance.
Keywords: Czechoslovakia, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, KOB

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs.
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Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: Consolidation
Bank (KOB)
At a Glance

Summary of Key Terms

The economic liberalization of the former Czech
and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began in
the early 1990s with concerted market
deregulation and a comprehensive program of
institutional reforms. Among these, the Ministry
of Finance was tasked with the removal of nonperforming “TOZ” loans (trvale obracející se
zásoby or “permanently revolving inventories”)
from state-owned banks’ balance sheets. The
TOZ loans, which were unsecured and
automatically rolled over, had been distributed
by the government in the 1970s in exchange for
the seizure of special pre-tax funds that
companies used to pay their operational
expenses. State-owned businesses would accept
these loans with the understanding that they
would then be compelled to re-lend them back to
the government (Desai 1995; Thorne 1993).
Although their creation was outlawed at the
beginning of 1991, the existing TOZ loans posed
a particular threat to banks’ balance sheets and
firms as well: inflation pushed interest rates up
from 6% to an unsustainable 23% and
companies
were
unable
to
negotiate
replacement loans at commercial rates (Aghevli
et al. 1992; Desai 1995; Rod 2014).
In response to concerns about looming budget
deficits, the Ministry of Finance established the
Consolidation Bank (Konsolidační Banka,
hereafter “KOB”) on February 25, 1991, in order
to acquire the TOZ loans (Desai 1995; Rod 2014).
The KOB was mandated to restructure the debt
to have maturities of eight years and bear
interest at a rate of 13% (Thorne 1993). Using
funds provided by the State Bank of
Czechoslovakia and additional loans from other
Czech and Slovak banks, primarily Czech Savings,
the KOB purchased CZK 110 billion
(approximately $3.7 billion) in non-performing
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Purpose: To relieve state-owned banks of nonperforming loans left over from the centrally
planned economy and restructure them with more
favorable terms (Rod 2014).
Launch Dates

Announcement: February
25, 1991
First transfer: 1991

Wind-down Dates

December 31, 2007, under
the Czech Consolidation
Agency

Size and Type of NPL
Problem

20% of banking system loans
in 1991 (Hayri and
McDermott 1995)
State-directed “TOZ” loans to
state-owned enterprises

Program Size

Not specified at outset

Eligible Institutions

State-owned banks that were
slated for privatization by
the Czechoslovakian
government
Open-bank only

Usage

Approximately CZK 125
billion in loans acquired from
four institutions between
1991 and 1992 (Desai 1995;
Rod 2014)

Outcomes

Unclear how much was
realized as a result of the
disposition of assets
In 2007, the Czech
Consolidation Agency
transferred CZK 17.2 billion
in remaining assets to the
Ministry of Finance

Ownership Structure

Government-owned

Notable Features

KOB transferred operations
to Consolidation Bank
Prague upon separation of
Czechoslovakia into two
sovereign states
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TOZ loans, which comprised almost 20% of all loans to businesses at the time (Desai 1995).
In 1992, the KOB conducted its second round of acquisitions, removing CZK 15 billion in bad
assets from commercial banks’ balance sheets at a 20% discount (Horčicová and Payson
1997).
The KOB ceased operations upon the peaceful breakup of the CSFR into the sovereign states
of Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. It then transferred its loan portfolio and operations
to the Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and Consolidation Bank Bratislava. In addition to
managing CZK 83.5 billion of the leftover TOZ loans, the CBP took on the responsibilities of
a regular commercial bank. It ended its bad-loan operations upon the creation of the Czech
Consolidation Agency (CCA) in 2001, a newly formed institution meant to resolve what
remained of the portfolio. After significantly reducing its assets under management through
block sales of receivables, the CCA terminated its operations on December 31, 2007,
transferring the CZK 17.2 billion remaining on its balance sheet to the Czech Ministry of
Finance (Rod 2014). It is unclear from secondary sources how much was realized through
the disposition of the KOB portfolio.
Summary Evaluation
Academic evaluations of the KOB, when available, paint a mixed legacy of success. Its
operations were considered to be “partial” in that they left banks to deal with a sizeable
volume of non-performing loans (Aghevli et al. 1992). According to Bonin and Huang (2000),
the transfer of bad assets was ultimately unsuccessful in contributing to a strong domestic
financial sector, one that would be able to compete in a globalized market. However,
Horčicová and Payson (1997) attribute this lack of success to the transitionary economic
conditions under which the government was operating, rather than the design of the KOB
itself.
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Konsolidační Banka : Czech and Slovak Federative Republic Context
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to
USD)

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)

S40.5 billion in 1990
$29.7 billion in 1991
$3,917 in 1990
$2,879 in 1991
Data for 1990:
Moody’s: Data unavailable
S&P: Data unavailable
Fitch: Data unavailable

Data for 1991:
Moody’s: Data unavailable
S&P: Data unavailable
Fitch: Data unavailable
Data not available for 1990
Size of banking system
Data not available for 1991
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available for 1990
GDP
Data not available for 1991
Size of banking system as a percentage of
Data not available for 1998
financial system
Data not available for 1999
Data not available for 1990
5-bank concentration of banking system
Data not available for 1991
Data not available for 1990
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for 1991
100% in 1990
Government ownership of banking system
100% in 1991
No in 1990
Existence of deposit insurance
No in 1991
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset
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Key Design Decisions
1.

Part of a Package: The Czechoslovakian government established the
Consolidation Bank (KOB) in order to remove NPLs from state-owned banks that
it was recapitalizing in preparation for privatization.

Beginning in 1991, the Ministry of Finance of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic
undertook a program of restructuring efforts in order to prepare for the national transition
to a market-based economy (Rod 2014). One step in the process involved recapitalizing state
banks through an allocation of five-year bonds worth approximately 8% of all bank loans to
state-owned enterprises. In order to determine recapitalization amounts, the government
asked the state banks what portion of non-performing loans should be removed from their
balance sheets (Desai 1995).
The Czechoslovakian government positioned the KOB’s operations as a necessary step
toward privatization. According to the Consolidation Bank Prague 1994 Annual Report, the
KOB was established in order to “deal with the consequences of certain decisions from the
time of the centrally planned economy, when loans failed to meet their main economic role
of a mechanism for the optimal allocation of capital” (Rod 2014).
2.

Legal Authority: It is unclear what legislation or legal authority was used to
establish or govern the KOB.

The Ministry of Finance was responsible for the creation of the KOB by governmental decree
(Desai 1995).
3.

Special Powers: The KOB did not appear to have special powers to enforce
collection or restructuring on delinquent borrowers.

Secondary sources consulted did not provide evidence of special powers.
4.

Mandate: The KOB’s mandate was to restructure non-performing loans at market
rates.

The government utilized the newly formed KOB as a repository for bad loans that needed to
be disposed of prior to banks’ privatization. The KOB purchased TOZ loans off state banks’
balance sheets and restructured them with eight-year maturities bearing interest rates of
13%, dependent on the discount rate (Desai 1995; Thorne 1993). According to leading
expert on Czechoslovakian economics, Dr. Aleš Rod, the government anticipated that the old
loans would be more easily refinanced within the context of the newly formed commercial
banking sector.
Although the government established KOB specifically to handle bad loans, its operations
were later extended in 1992 to encompass more regular banking activities (Rod 2014).
According to Dr. Rod, the KOB operated with a limited banking license that enabled it to
accept deposits from legal entities, provide and manage loans within the scope of the bank's
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business plan, and work out payments and settlements without payments with foreign
countries.
5.

Ownership Structure: The KOB was owned and operated by the Czechoslovakian
government.

All Czechoslovakian banking institutions created between the years 1989 and 1991 were
government-owned (Rod 2014).
6.

Governance/Administration: Details regarding internal governance and
administration are unclear from secondary sources consulted.

Although annual reports for the KOB’s operations exist, they have not yet been translated or
digitized.
7.

Size: The Czechoslovakian government does not seem to have set a specific cap
on the size of the KOB’s operations.

Secondary resources consulted do not mention any cap on the size of the program.
8.

Funding Sources: As a public institution, the KOB utilized funds from a number of
state-owned banks in order to carry out its loan purchases.

Initially, the KOB was charged with purchasing CZK 110 billion in TOZ loans from the Czech
Commercial Bank and Slovak General Credit Bank. The State Bank of Czechoslovakia, the
central bank, provided funds for these purchases at a real interest rate of -3%. Other Czech
and Slovak banks, notably Czech Savings, provided funds at an average interest rate of 11%,
or a real interest rate of -1% (Desai 1995).
9.

Eligible Institutions: Initially, the four state-owned Czechoslovakian banks that
held TOZ loans were eligible for assistance from the KOB.

These four banks (Commercial Bank, Investment Bank, General Credit Bank of Slovakia, and
Czechoslovak Trade Bank) held non-performing TOZ loans generated by the government in
the decades leading up to privatization. In 1992, the KOB purchased CZK 14.7 billion in (nonTOZ) bad loans from Commercial Bank and Investment Bank (Rod 2014).3
It appears from secondary sources consulted that any state-owned Czechoslovakian bank
that held non-performing loans and was slated for privatization was eligible for participation
(Desai 1995; Rod 2014). As previously noted, it seems that the government compelled
participation in the program as a requirement for recapitalization (Desai 1995).

3

It is unclear from sources consulted whether the KOB purchased TOZ loans from Trade Bank.
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10. Eligible Assets: In addition to the removal of TOZ loans from state banks’ balance
sheets, the KOB was also charged with the acquisition of other bad loans that
would interfere with the transition to a market-based economy.
These non-performing loans, known as “trvale obracející se zásoby”—“TOZ” loans or,
literally, “permanently revolving inventories”—were the result of a concerted government
effort in the 1970s to seize special pre-tax reserves used by state-owned enterprises to
finance their operating expenses. In their place, Czechoslovakian authorities began
distributing these unsecured TOZ loans to enterprises with the expectation that they would
be re-lent to the government. When interest rates on the TOZ loans increased sharply from
6% to 23% in 1989, the threat of large budget deficits pushed the government to recapitalize
banks in exchange for the removal of TOZ loans from their balance sheets (Desai 1995).
The KOB also took on bad debt that accumulated during the first stage of economic transition,
including non-performing loans made in relation to new foreign investment and “pioneer”
loans made to new private companies (Horčicová and Payson 1997).
11.

Acquisition (Mechanics): There were two rounds of purchases during which the
KOB acquired assets using funds borrowed from the central bank and other
state-owned banks.

The KOB purchased CZK 110 billion (approximately $3.7 billion) in non-performing TOZ
loans, which comprised almost 20% of all loans to businesses at the time (Desai 1995). In
1992, the KOB conducted its second round of acquisitions, removing CZK 15 billion in bad
assets from commercial banks’ balance sheets at a 20% discount (Horčicová and Payson
1997). These acquisitions were considered to comprise “a large portion of loan collection
from bank clients” (Desai 1995).
12.

Acquisition (Pricing): It is unclear what methodology the Czechoslovakian
government used to determine the pricing of the TOZ loans.

The first CZK 110 billion purchase of TOZ loans from the largest Czech and Slovak banks was
carried out for 80% of their nominal value (Desai 1995).
13.

Recovery and Disposal: A successor institution to the KOB, the Czech
Consolidation Agency, disposed of assets under management through block sales
of receivables.

The KOB was split up into two separate banks—Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and
Consolidation Bank Bratislava—upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Following the
split, the CBP took on the responsibilities and operations of a “normal” commercial bank
(Rod 2014).
On September 1, 2001, the government of the Czech Republic created the Czech
Consolidation Agency (CCA) for the express purpose of dealing with the bad loan portfolios
of the CBP. Though it is unclear from sources consulted whether the CCA was created as a
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designated asset management company, it seemed as though the KOB continued to hold
nonperforming loans without attempting to collect (Rod 2014).
After significantly reducing its assets under management through block sales of receivables,4
the CCA ceased operations on December 31, 2007, transferring the CZK 17.2 billion
remaining on its balance sheet to the Ministry of Finance (Rod 2014).
14.

Timeframe: Although the KOB was initially given a temporary license to carry
out loan operations for four months, its timeframe was later extended to six
months.

The KOB as an institution existed from February 25, 1991, through December 31, 1992, at
which point its portfolio and responsibilities were split between the newly formed
Consolidation Bank Prague and Consolidation Bank Bratislava (Desai 1995; Rod 2014).
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